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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper investigates how accounting is used to disguise and realize money 
laundering activities in specific socio-economic and political contexts and whether 
discretionary accruals can provide evidence of such illicit practices realized through legally 
registered Mafia firms (LMFs).  
Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on a sample of 224 Italian firms identified 
as LMFs, due to having been confiscated by judicial authorities because of their owners being 
accused of Mafia-type association. Using a multivariate regression model, specifically 
developed discretionary accrual proxies for LMFs are compared with those of a population of 
lawful firms (LWFs). 
Findings – The results reveal that in the pre- and confiscation years, LMFs manage aggregate, 
revenue and expense accruals in order to smooth earnings and disguise money laundering. In 
contrast, in the post-confiscation years there is no significant difference in level of accrual 
management between LMFs and LWFs as a consequence of the intervention of legal 
administrators. 
Originality/value – This study adopts discretionary revenue and expense accrual proxies that 
provide additional insight into the simultaneous manipulation of revenues and expenses, linked 
to money laundering, which may not be fully detected by traditional aggregate accrual models. 
Furthermore, it suggests that the incentive for unlisted LMFs to manage accruals may be 
fostered by the irrelevance of their financial statements to trades with stakeholders. More 
importantly, this paper may aid regulators in identifying accounting signals that can be used in 
risk assessment models or in the detection of criminal practices. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper aims to understand whether accounting information can contribute to understanding 
the mechanisms of criminal funding and money laundering in specific socio-economic and 
political contexts. On this matter, Compin (2008) suggests that one of the roles of accounting 
in a criminal business is to mask the crime by ensuring that the accounting information, 
although deceptive, contains all the necessary virtues and in turn maintains an impression of 
rationality and economic credibility. In particular, this study investigates how accounting is 
used to disguise and realize money laundering activities and whether specifically developed 
discretionary expense and revenue accruals models, as well as those classical based on 
aggregate accruals, can provide evidence of such illicit practices realized through legally 
registered Mafia firms (LMFs). In this regard, according to criminologists’ terminology, LMFs 
are defined as firms that are legally registered and apparently engage in lawful activities but are 
owned, directly or indirectly (through figureheads), by a Mafia family (Champeyrache, 2004). 
LMFs differ from lawful firms (LWFs) in three main ways (Gambetta, 1993; Fantò, 1999): the 
owners are members of a criminal organization; funding may partially or totally come from 
illegal activities; and criminal methods involving violence, intimidation or corruption are 
commonly used while doing business. Legal and illegal activities are therefore closely 
intertwined within LMFs as the legal activities mostly serve to launder profits stemming from 
illegal ones (Fantò, 1999). Furthermore, criminal methods allow LMFs to benefit from 
competitive advantages over LWFs (Fantò, 1999; Arlacchi, 2007) and a market power arising 
from the control of artificially scarce resources (Champeyrache, 2014). 
A reliable estimate of the presence of LMFs in Italy is hardly achievable. Nonetheless, the 
relevance of the phenomenon can be inferred from a recent study, performed by Transcrime 
(2013) on behalf of Italian Ministry of Interior, which quantifies the annual illegal revenues of 
Mafias in Italy between 8.3 and 13 billion Euros. Furthermore, 8.7% of the total investment of 
Mafias in legal economy between 1983 and 2011 is represented by companies and stocks. On 
the other hand, prior studies document the infiltration of Italian Mafias in the legal economy of 
several European countries such as Spain and Germany (Forgione, 2009; Roth, 2009; 
Transcrime, 2013). Importantly, money laundering practices cannot be exclusively related to 
Italian Mafia organizations. In this regard, Eurostat (2013) statistical study on money 
laundering in Europe shows that mostly all European countries have reported money laundering 
transactions involving firms in recent years.  
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The study is based on a sample of 224 Italian firms identified as LMFs, due to having been 
confiscated at some point by judicial authorities because of their owners being accused of 
Mafia-type association according to the article 416-bis of the Italian criminal law. More 
importantly, according to this article, a charge of Mafia-type association entails the automatic 
confiscation of all the assets of the accused individual, including firms and related shares, which 
represent the profit of the crime or its investment. After the first instance of court confiscation 
LMFs are entrusted to one or more legal administrators. The legal administration is an 
institution designed to reinstate the legality within the confiscated LMFs while fostering their 
business performance and level of employment. Hence, this paper examines LMFs both before 
and after their confiscation by comparing them with a population of unlisted LWFs for which 
there is no evidence of Mafia infiltration. Indeed, a further objective of the study is to assess 
whether the confiscation of LMFs has a significant impact on their accrual management 
practices.  
Before formulating the hypotheses, the study analyzes previously documented Mafia money 
laundering practices and the favorable context for LMFs to adopt them according to social 
theories, borrowed from other disciplines (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2014; Parker and Guthrie, 
2014), describing the influence of the context on corporate illegal behaviors. Subsequently, the 
authors envisage how these practices may be reflected in discretionary accruals patterns. 
Overall, the results reveal that in the pre- and confiscation years LMFs manage aggregate, 
revenue and expense accruals in order to smooth earnings and disguise money laundering. In 
contrast, in the post-confiscation years there is no significant difference in level of accrual 
management between LMFs and LWFs, as evidence of the relevant impact of legal 
administrators’ takeover on the accounting practices of LMFs. Furthermore, in the confiscation 
year LMFs upward manage both revenue and expense accruals with a negative cumulative 
effect on aggregate accruals and income. Adjustments of prior to confiscation misreporting and 
the regularization of some transactions carried out by legal administrators may explain these 
latter results. These conclusions confirm previous findings (Stubben, 2010) on the informative 
superiority of specific accrual models over aggregate accrual models in detecting a combination 
of revenue and expense manipulation.   
This study can be situated within the academic literature on accrual-based earnings 
management. In this respect, prior research examines accrual management in varying types of 
firms and contexts which may have some similarities with the case of LMFs in Italy. In 
particular, different studies analyze accrual management within: firms committing financial 
statement fraud (Beneish, 1997; Lee et al., 1999; Jones et al., 2008; Perols and Lougee, 2011), 
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firms with political connection (Chaney et al., 2011), socially irresponsible firms (Chih et al., 
2008; Gargouri et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2012), unlisted firms (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; 
Coppens and Peek, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006), family firms in Italy (Prencipe et al., 2008). 
However, these studies mostly focus on aggregate accruals rather than considering each specific 
type of accruals. Hence, they do not provide information on how the accrual management is 
achieved and which underlying practices discretionary accruals may reflect. Conversely, this 
study adopts specifically developed discretionary revenue and expense accrual proxies that, 
compared to aggregate accrual models, provide additional insight into the simultaneous 
manipulation of revenues and expenses, linked to money laundering activities. Furthermore, 
although some traits of LMFs can be identified in the aforementioned studies on accrual 
management, this study contributes to the accounting literature given that, to the best of authors’ 
knowledge, it is the first that specifically seeks to relate accrual management to money 
laundering activities within the context of LMFs. These unlisted firms may particularly interest 
the scientific community due to their singularities. Indeed, they are socially irresponsible by 
nature and their incentives, operating context and modus operandi differ from those of listed 
companies. In particular, this study suggests that the incentive of unlisted firms such as LMFs 
to engage in accrual management for illicit purposes increases whether specific competitive 
advantages or a dominant market position make their financial statements irrelevant for trading 
with stakeholders.  Finally, this paper may aid practitioners and regulators in identifying 
accounting signals that can be used in risk assessment models or in the detection of criminal 
infiltrations and related illicit practices, especially in contexts similar to that of LMFs. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews the literature and develops 
the hypotheses; section 3 describes the research design and sample data; section 4 presents 
empirical results; section 5 includes discussions and concluding remarks. 
 
2 Theoretical background and hypothesis development  
2.1 Legally registered Mafia firms: operating context and theory  
One of the main reasons for criminal organizations to take on new businesses is to be able to 
invest and launder significant financial resources coming from illegal activities, such as usury, 
extortion, drug, waste and arms trafficking and so on. In this way, criminal organizations 
achieve high profits, power and social consensus by ensuring employment and income for the 
population in the areas where they exercise control of the territory (Fantò, 1999; Riccardi, 2014; 
Sciarrone, 2014). Fantò (1999) suggests that the main trait of LMFs is not the type of business 
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run but the nature of the capital accumulation process that leads to their formation as well as 
the strength of intimidation on which they are hinged. In particular, the mafia-style intimidation 
is a source of surplus value and competitive advantages of LMFs over LWFs. In this regard, 
Arlacchi (1983, 2007) identifies the following competitive advantages of the LMFs over the 
LWFs: discouragement of competition (securing goods and raw materials at favorable prices, 
as well as orders, contracts and commercial outlets using criminal intimidation); wage 
compression (evasion of social security contributions and insurance, non-payment of overtime, 
denial of trade union rights); availability of financial resources (investment of huge proceeds 
coming from illegal activities without bearing the cost of credit).   
Economic, social, political and institutional context is favorable for LMFs to thrive and 
engage in fraudulent practices. In particular, the influence of the context is implicit in a model, 
usually defined as fraud triangle, in which illegal corporate behaviors are attributable to the 
interactive effects of motivation or pressure to engage in corporate illegality, the provision of 
opportunities for it to occur (e.g. ineffective control), and the personal attitudes (ethical values) 
allowing the rationalization of the dishonest act (McKendall and Wagner, 1997; Wilks and 
Zimbelman, 2004; Cohen et al., 2010; Morales et al., 2014; Soltani, 2014). These fraud 
triggering factors could be identified in LMFs. Indeed, LMFs may be a means of Mafiosi 
owner-managers to launder dirty money and achieve profits by engaging in illegal practices, 
under the protection of the criminal organization granting competitive advantages over LWFs. 
Rationalization processes for the self-justification of illegal behaviors may also occur among 
employees (Cohen et al., 2010) who may also be pressured because of their dependence on 
LMFs for their livelihood in economically depressed Southern Italian regions, where LMFs are 
mostly located. In this regard, a power of Mafiosi owners, based on the control of scarce 
economic resources, can be identified as a context feature that supports illegal practices within 
LMFs as well as their development (Lukes, 2005; Palmer, 2012).  
In particular, Champeyrache (2014) proposes an institutional theory supporting artificial 
scarcity (Veblen, 1915, 1921) as the functioning principle of LMFs. This means that Mafia 
organizations use LMFs to voluntarily and collectively create an imbalance between supply and 
demand (scarcity) in markets they infiltrate, in order to dominate decollectivized non-mafiosi 
individuals (Dugger, 1989). More specifically, LMFs create artificial scarcity by controlling 
and restricting to individuals outside their criminal network the access to resources and final 
goods in the territories under their sovereignty. At the same time, the economic power granted 
by artificial scarcity fosters the social status and the mystification of Mafia organizations which 
allow LMFs to gain social legitimacy (Dugger, 1980). Indeed, non-mafiosi interpret these 
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barriers to accessing goods as a restriction due to their lack of inclusion in the upper strata, 
creating an incentive to emulate LMFs and abide by mafia rules to access goods 
(Champeyrache, 2014). In particular, LMFs use their competitive advantages (e.g. superior 
access to liquidity) and other criminal methods to take over strategic sectors (e.g. raw material 
market and public procurement) and establish monopolistic high prices for scarce resources 
which prevent would-be and existing entrepreneurs from freely developing activities and 
individual talents (Arlacchi, 2007). Furthermore, LMFs consolidate their market power by 
expelling non-mafiosi entrepreneurs from infiltrated markets or taking control of their firms 
using direct violence and/or asphyxiation through usurious loans (Masciandaro, 1997; 
Champeyrache, 2004). Specifically, Mafia organizations are able to benefit from situations of 
economic crisis, by offering financial resources to entrepreneurs who have difficulty in 
accessing credit, or by taking over troubled businesses as fronts for money laundering (Riccardi, 
2014; Sciarrone and Storti, 2014). The tendency of LMFs to establish a monopoly power is 
consistent with previous studies, finding that the sectors more vulnerable to Mafia infiltration 
are characterized by low technological level, high labor and cash intensity, predominance of 
small-medium enterprises that compete on the local market (e.g. construction), low 
international competition and strong public regulation (e.g. competitive bidding) which allows 
the Mafia to put pressure on policy-makers and gain advantageous positions in accessing public 
resources (Daniele and Marani, 2008; Lavezzi, 2008; Riccardi, 2014; Sciarrone and Storti, 
2014). 
On the other hand, other studies focus on the influence of the institutional context upon 
corporate illicit practices (Misangyi et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2013; Gabbioneta et al., 2013).  
In this regard, unlike other forms of organized crime for which making a profit is the primary 
goal (Finckenauer, 2005), the Mafia is not oriented exclusively towards profit-making, but also 
seeks power (Sciarrone, 2014). Indeed, Mafia organizations can be regarded as politico-
institutional authorities that seek political control of the territories where they are established 
by sharing forms of government and governance with the state and local authorities (Catanzaro, 
1985; Mattina, 2011). In this respect, Dickie (2004, pp. 67-78) asserts that the central political 
authorities of Italy have repeatedly relied on the Mafia to serve as an instrument of local 
government during periods of turmoil in Sicilian history. It can be inferred that the development 
of Mafia-type activities is more likely in weak governance contexts where political institutions 
are absent or have failed to enforce rules regulating economic processes and protecting property 
rights (Catanzaro, 1985; Gambetta, 1993; Venkatesh, 1997). In addition, ineffective institutions 
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foster corrupt practices and the private appropriation of public resources which may result in a 
widespread lowering of the sense of legality (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2011). 
The infiltration of Mafia organizations in political institutions is mainly achieved by 
distorting electoral outcomes and intervening in the market for votes (Buonanno et al., 2016). 
In particular, Mafia organizations procure votes to politicians (through either threats or rewards 
to citizens) in exchange for favors represented by diversion of public funds and procurement 
contracts, favorable legislation and lenient prosecution (Gambetta, 1993). Importantly, the deep 
infiltration of Mafia organizations in public and political institutions and the weak legality 
culture of their members may undermine the ‘arm’s length’ social distance required for 
independent scrutiny and appraisal (Westphal and Clement, 2008; Gabbioneta et al., 2013). 
This situation may offer a fertile institutional context not only for illicit behaviors with a 
relatively low risk of detection but also for LMFs to thrive and expand (Gond et al., 2009). In 
this respect, various sociological studies and investigations by judicial authorities show the 
capacity of LMFs to take part in the processes by which contracts for public works are awarded, 
through both their capacity for intimidation and the control they exert over local authorities 
(Capacchione, 2008; Di Fiore, 2008; Anselmo, 2009). Above and beyond capitalist 
accumulation, this capacity to dominate markets and carry out works gives Mafia organizations 
a high degree of political and institutional legitimacy, shared with the authorities, due to the 
greater importance now given to private enterprise in establishing and delivering public policy 
in mechanisms of territorial governance (Mattina, 2011). 
Finally, institutional theories state that regulatory scrutiny is dampened to the extent that an 
organization achieve an institutional ascription of probity by openly conforming to social 
expectations, although only symbolically (Bromley and Powell, 2012; Gabbioneta et al., 2013). 
In particular, LMFs meet social expectations and gain social consensus and support by 
redistributing revenues and providing employment in depressed Southern Italian regions 
(Gambetta and Reuter, 1995; Calderoni and Riccardi, 2011). Hence, this support from at least 
some of the local population may protect LMFs and discourage local authorities’ inspections 
and interventions even in case of suspicions of illicit practices. In this respect, Sciarrone (1998) 
asserts that Mafia organizations have a social capital of relations within civil society, the 
political world, and local populations due to their ability to form social networks and 
relationships, to set up exchanges, create ties of trust, exchange and favors, and establish 
reciprocal duties. These socio-territorial roots and the construction of a capital of social 
relations are a primary underlying reason for the persistence of Mafias. 
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2.2 Definition of discretionary accruals proxies  
Prior studies use a wide variety of discretionary accruals (DAC) measures as surrogates for 
accrual management (Jones, 1991; Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; 
Kothari et al., 2005). However, these studies mostly focus on aggregate accruals rather than 
considering each specific type of accruals. In this regard, previous research questions aggregate 
accrual models for providing biased and noisy estimates of discretion (Dechow et al., 1995; 
Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Stubben, 2010). Furthermore, McNichols and Wilson (2000) 
suggest that future progress in the accrual management literature is more likely to come from 
the examination of specific accruals. In confirmation of this, in a recent study Stubben (2010), 
using a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement actions for a mix of revenue- and expense 
related misstatements, finds that revenue accrual models are more likely than aggregate accrual 
models to detect a combination of revenue and expense manipulation, especially in growth 
firms. Hence, following previous research (Caylor, 2010; Stubben, 2010; Capalbo et al., 2014), 
this study uses discretionary revenue accruals (DREV) to measure revenue accrual management 
as well as discretionary aggregate accruals (DAC) to measure aggregate accrual management. 
In addition, the authors build a new measure of discretionary expense accruals (DEXP) to 
measure expense accrual management. In essence, the authors consider that LMFs may resort 
to a combination of revenue and expense manipulation, for example through fictitious 
transactions, in order to achieve their illicit purposes. As manipulation of revenues and expenses 
can be performed in the same direction, increasing revenues and expenses or vice versa, the 
total effect may not be detected in discretionary aggregate accrual models that do not provide 
information as to which components of earnings firms manage and how the accrual 
management is achieved (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Stubben, 2010). Moreover, unlike 
other specific accruals (e.g. allowance for bad debts, depreciations, etc.), revenue and expense 
accruals are common across industries and represent a large portion of the earnings discretion 
available to firms (Stubben, 2010). Finally, similar to previous studies (Warfield et al., 1995; 
Klein, 2002; Kim et al., 2012), this paper initially employs the unsigned value of the 
aforementioned accrual management proxies. Indeed, accrual management can be either 
income-increasing or income-decreasing and the authors do not have reasons for expecting any 
of them to be prevalent within LMFs in the long-term. 
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2.3 Accrual management within LMFs and hypothesis formulation 
Prior to carrying out this research the authors expect higher accrual management intensity 
within LMFs before confiscation relative to LWFs. These expectations are based both on the 
characteristics of LMFs and on some previous studies examining firms with similarities in 
certain aspects. In particular, prior studies assume that accrual management is mostly performed 
to boost earnings rather than reducing them, mainly because they analyze listed companies (e.g. 
Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Zang, 
2012). On the other hand, this study examines unlisted firms whose incentives and accrual 
management patterns may differ from those of listed companies. Indeed, previous studies 
identify tax avoidance as a primary incentive for accrual management in unlisted firms, 
especially in countries with strong alignment of financial and tax accounting (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Goncharov and Zimmermann, 2006; Van Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen, 2008; Marques et al., 2011). In particular, in these countries, including Italy 
(Alford et al., 1993; Hung, 2000; Coppens and Peek, 2005), firms prefer low volatility in 
earnings (Ball et al., 2000; Coppens and Peek, 2005). Indeed, third-party effect, in the form of 
tax demanded by tax authorities, makes communication with stakeholders costly and can be 
interpreted as a breakdown of the revelation principle assumption justifying the benefit of 
income-decreasing accrual management (Arya et al., 1998, 2003; Walker, 2013). It is worth 
mentioning that the financial statements of the unlisted firms of this study are prepared 
according to the same legally defined Italian GAAP. Indeed, the Italian legislative decree n. 
38/2005 requires the adoption of IFRS only for the listed companies, without the option for the 
unlisted firms to similarly adhere to IFRS. In particular, Italian GAAP are significantly affected 
by tax considerations given that for example taxable deductible expenses should necessarily be 
recorded in the income statement and the accounting income is the basis for the calculation of 
the taxable income.  
On the other hand, the use of financial statements in contracting with stakeholders (e.g. 
banks, customers, suppliers, employees) reduces incentives for unlisted firms to engage in 
accrual management for tax avoidance purposes (Klassen, 1997; Beatty and Harris, 1999; 
Coppens and Peek, 2005). Indeed, an income-decreasing accrual management may negatively 
affect the terms of trades with the aforementioned stakeholders as well as resulting in other 
negative consequences, including larger costs of debt and equity or a higher likelihood of a 
lawsuit (Francis et al., 2005; Ibrahim et al., 2011). In this regard, based on a survey of U.S. 
financial executives, Dichev et al. (2013) find that the earnings management motivations to 
avoid violation of debt covenants and influence non-capital stakeholders are much stronger for 
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unlisted firms, relative to listed firms, consistent with lower dependence on capital markets and 
more emphasis on contractual considerations. Nonetheless, LMFs can usually count on 
financial resources coming from illegal activities which reduce the need for bank financing and 
the related incentive to report a positive financial performance or an acceptable accrual quality. 
This latter incentive is further weakened because of the usage of criminal methods such as 
intimidation and bribing to obtain favorable terms in trades with other stakeholders such as 
suppliers, customers, and employees. Hence, LMFs do not have to face trade-offs in their 
financial and tax reporting decisions.   
Assuming tax avoidance as a main incentive for LMFs to engage in accrual management, 
the authors expect LMFs to prefer small profits to large profits as well as a low volatility in 
earnings. Indeed, avoiding high earnings reduces taxes and avoiding persistent low/negative 
earnings reduces the probability of being investigated by the tax authorities (Herrmann and 
Inoue, 1996; Coppens and Peek, 2005). Hence, LMFs may use discretionary accruals to 
sustainably smooth earnings over a long period. These considerations lead to the first hypothesis 
of this study: 
 
H1a: in the pre-confiscation years LMFs smooth earnings through discretional accruals 
more than LWFs do.  
 
Money laundering, a raison d'être for LMFs, is a structured activity aiming to conceal the 
illegal source of criminal proceeds by disguising them as lawful earning. Three basic money 
laundering stages can generally be identified: placement, layering and integration (Gilmore, 
1999; Buchanan, 2004; He, 2010). Placement is the process of introducing the proceeds from 
illegal activities into the financial system in a way that government authorities are not able to 
detect. Layering is the process of generating complex financial transactions to distance the 
funds from their point of criminal origin and ownership. Finally, integration is the conversion 
of the illegal proceeds into apparently legitimate business earnings through normal financial or 
commercial operations. 
The money laundering stages in which LMFs are engaged may depend on their activities 
and characteristics. Specifically, the set-up or acquisition of a firm by Mafia members can be 
realized with proceeds of illicit activities and be part of the money laundering integration stage. 
However, LMFs can also be involved in the other two stages. In particular, Martocchia et al. 
(2014) examine several cases of LMFs engaging in the so called trade-based money laundering 
which is among the most used layering technique (Maitland Irwin et al., 2012). The Financial 
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Action Task Force (2006) defines trade-based money laundering as: the process of disguising 
the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to 
legitimize their illicit origins. More specifically, first LMFs get public contracts awarded using 
bribery, intimidation and other forms of influence over the public administration and especially 
over local public officials and politicians (Caneppele et al., 2009; Savona, 2010). Subsequently, 
LMFs use false or inflated invoicing for work not performed or material not used or not meeting 
specifications, in order to create business expense records and to transfer cash to colluded 
parties that subsequently kick the money back to the Mafia organizations and/or corrupt public 
officials. Trade-based money laundering is strictly linked to tax avoidance practices given that 
the misrepresentation of value of trade transactions has a direct effect on value added tax and 
income tax. 
Money laundering through cash intensive businesses (Gilmour and Ridley, 2015) is a further 
method used to deposit illicit cash into the banking sector (placement). In this method, a 
business typically expected to receive a large proportion of its revenue as cash uses its accounts 
to deposit criminally derived cash, as well as legitimate cash, by falsifying receipts and invoices 
(Fantò, 1999; Fiorentini, 1999). LMFs of cash-intensive sectors (e.g. retail stores, convenience 
stores, hotels, restaurants, etc.) may be involved in the placement stage of money laundering. 
This practice may be particularly typical for long-live LMFs permanently established in the 
territory which have managed to gain a social consensus and a consolidated banking profile 
(Levi and Reuter, 2006; Gilmour and Ridley, 2015). Another money laundering placement 
technique, commonly adopted by LMFs, is based on the payment of “black salaries” to 
employees using dirty money (Caneppele et al., 2009; Martocchia et al., 2014). 
The aforementioned money laundering practices within LMFs may be realized through 
transaction management affecting cash flow from operations (CFO) during the fiscal year and 
resulting in abnormal expense and revenue patterns showed in their financial statements. In this 
regard, in the survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005), financial executives of U.S. listed 
companies express a preference for managing earnings through real transactions affecting CFO 
rather than through accruals. However, a wider usage of accruals can be assumed in LMFs 
relative to listed firms. In particular, accrual management may be a necessary complement of 
transaction management carried out through false trade documents in order to disguise money 
laundering (Caneppele et al., 2009; Martocchia et al., 2014; Gilmour and Ridley, 2015). Indeed, 
discretionary accruals may allow adjusting abnormal and fraudulently manipulated 
expenses/revenues at year end, while keeping an impression of rationality and economic 
credibility of the accounting information (Compin, 2008). Hence, a more intensive accrual 
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management within LMFs may be the natural consequence of opportunistically manipulated 
accounting information that does not reflect the patterns of a standard business activity.  
Moreover, the authors expect a higher level of accrual management for LMFs due to the low 
level of scrutiny from outsiders of these firms compared to the LWFs, in connection with the 
protection ensured by their criminal ties and infiltrators in all spheres of political and 
institutional life of the country. Indeed, previous studies find that a low external monitoring 
intensity is associated with a higher level of accrual management (Duellman et al., 2013; 
Wongsunwai, 2013). In particular, some analogy may be found with the case of politically 
connected firms studied by Chaney et al. (2011) which exhibit higher accrual management than 
firms lacking such connections. Similar to politically connected firms, to the extent that 
organized crime provides protection to LMFs so that low quality accounting information is not 
penalized, LMFs might simply care less about the quality of the information they disclose and 
invest less time to accurately portray their accruals (Chaney et al., 2011). In this case, the quality 
of information would be low due to inattention on the part of the firm’s managers. In addition, 
lack of managerial competencies may also negatively affect the quality of accounting 
information. Indeed, in LMFs allegiance to the Mafia family may be considered as the essential 
criterion for appointing future agents often recruited from a relatively small pool of affiliates 
and trustees (Duplat et al., 2012). Conversely, in LWFs the selection process is largely driven 
by the skills and abilities of these candidates to run the business. Based on previous 
considerations, this study empirically tests the following research hypotheses: 
 
Relative to LWFs, in the pre-confiscation years LMFs engage more in: 
H2a: aggregate accrual management; 
H3a: revenue accrual management;  
H4a: expense accrual management. 
 
After confiscation most of the LMFs fall into financial distress and often end up in liquidation 
(ANBSC, 2012). The main reasons for that may be: the loss of privileged and illegal business 
opportunities, the increase in operating expenses (e.g., regularization of undeclared workers 
and increase in service expenses for external support) and the shortage of funding given that 
the dirty money flow is interrupted and the banks are more reluctant to grant credit. In this 
respect, previous studies find that distressed firms prior to bankruptcy engage in income-
increasing accrual management in order to conceal the deteriorating financial conditions until 
they improve (Smith et al., 2001; Rosner, 2003; Charitou et al., 2007; García Lara et al., 2009). 
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More importantly, after the confiscation one of the tasks of legal administrators is the 
reinstatement of legality within LMFs. Hence, accounting adjustments, including accrual 
reversals, to correct previous misreporting and the regularization and settlement of some 
transactions may still lead to higher accrual management measures relative to LWFs in the year 
of confiscation, although for different reasons from those prior to confiscation. In particular, 
earnings smoothing and money laundering concealing may no longer be the main incentives. 
Therefore, the further hypotheses of this study are: 
 
H1b: in the confiscation year there is no significant difference between LMFs and LWFs in 
level of earnings smoothing through discretionary accruals. 
 
Relative to LWFs, in the confiscation year LMFs engage more in:  
H2b: aggregate accrual management; 
H3b: revenue accrual management; 
H4b: expense accrual management. 
 
In contract, in the years following the confiscation year the authors expect practices of LMFs 
to be more aligned to those of LWFs with no significant difference in their degree of accrual 
management. Hence, the final hypotheses of the study are: 
 
In the post-confiscation years there is no significant difference between LMFs and LWFs in 
level of: 
H1c: earnings smoothing through discretionary accruals; 
H2c: aggregate accrual management; 
H3c: revenue accrual management; 
H4c: expense accrual management. 
  
3 Methodology 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
LMFs sample consists of 224 firms confiscated to organized crime, some of them provided by 
National Agency for the Management and Assignment of Seized and Confiscated Assets 
(ANBSC) and others found in online newspapers and AIDA database. ANBSC is the national 
body currently in charge of the management and assignment of assets, including firms, seized 
and confiscated to Mafia organizations by Italian judicial authorities. It is noteworthy that the 
sample size is acceptable if compared with that of other studies on financial statement fraud 
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(e.g. Beneish, 1997; Lee et al., 1999, Jones et al., 2008; Perols and Lougee, 2011). The financial 
statements for all firms are obtained from AIDA, the Italian Bureau Van Dijk database. It 
contains comprehensive information on 1 million companies with a turnover above € 500,000 
in Italy, including the indication for some of them of the confiscation status and date of 
confiscation. Only 54 out of 1,663 firms provided by ANBSC have financial statements 
available on AIDA, mostly because of their small size. In addition, the authors include firms 
confiscated in first instance found on AIDA database (118) and online newspapers (52) until 
reaching a total of 224. For the 224 LMFs the authors obtain from AIDA available financial 
statement data for the year of confiscation and for the years prior to and following the 
confiscation within the period from 2003 to 2012. The authors then estimate the base regression 
model of Eq. (7) including LMF-years and AIDA population of active unlisted firm-years from 
2003 to 2012 in LMFs industries. This study initially avoids the matched sample procedure 
because of the concerns on its validity raised by Cram at al. (2009). However, the base 
regression model includes control variables for year, size and two-digit industry SIC code. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure that yields the 224 LMFs and the 78,340 
LWFs. 
(Insert Table 1 approximately here) 
Table 2 presents the industry distribution by two-digit SIC groups of LMFs in the sample and 
AIDA population of active unlisted firms with available financial data from 2003 to 2012 in the 
same industries as the LMFs.  
(Insert Table 2 approximately here) 
Compared to the population of active and unlisted firms on AIDA with available financial data 
from 2003 to 2012, the sample LMFs are especially more abundant in industry groups: building 
construction-general contractors and operative builders (18.30% of LMFs sample versus 7.00% 
of population), food stores (7.14% versus 2.22%) and Motor freight transportation and 
warehousing (8.04% versus 3.69%). On the other hand, there is a lower proportion of LMFs 
mostly in wholesale trade, durable goods (10.27% versus 17.95%), business services (0.89% 
versus 6.38%) and fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment 
(0.89 versus 8.98%). It is noteworthy that Construction (SIC codes 15-17) is the sector with the 
highest cumulative percentage (23.21%) of LMFs in the sample. Indeed, construction is a sector 
with a high concentration of public contracts whose control represents a relevant business for 
Mafia organizations (Caneppele et al., 2009; Savona, 2010). Wholesale Trade (SIC codes 50-
51) is the second most representative sector (18.75%) in LMFs sample, followed by 
Transportation & Public Utilities (SIC codes 42-49 – 13.41%) and Retail Trade (SIC codes 52-
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59 – 12.96%). These latest sectors are cash-intensive and/or supply cash-intensive businesses 
which are particularly suitable for depositing illicit cash into the banking sector (Gilmour and 
Ridley, 2015). Furthermore, Wholesale and Retail Trade sectors include a wide range of 
subsectors that can be exploited for illegal activities of different kinds, such as counterfeiting 
(e.g. in the case of the wholesale and retail trade of clothing and textiles) or drugs trafficking 
(e.g. in the case of import/export companies) (Lo Bello, 2011; Savona and Riccardi, 2015). 
Cumulatively, the industry distribution of LMFs in the sample is consistent with previous 
studies that find LMFs mostly concentrated in sectors characterized by scant openness to 
foreign investments, low-tech industries, cash- and labor-intensiveness, small-medium 
enterprises, strong deregulation, high territorial distinctiveness, and high involvement of public 
resources and public authorities (Savona, 2015). 
 
3.2 Accrual management proxies (dependent variables) 
In order to test the hypotheses, the authors need to build the measures of discretionary accruals 
to input as dependent variables in the base regression model. Hence, they calculate DAC as the 
residuals from the following Eq. (1) based on the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
with a control for performance (Kothari et al., 2005). Its parameters are estimated cross-
sectionally for each industry-year with at least 15 observations:  
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Where in year t (or t - 1), ACCR denotes total accruals; TA, ∆REV, ∆AR, PPE, and ROA 
represent total assets, changes in net revenue, changes in accounts receivables, property, plant, 
and equipment, and return on assets, respectively. Consistent with previous studies on accrual 
management (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), ACCR are 
computed as: 
																									 = ∆ − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ −  																																			(2) 
Where: 
∆CA = change in current assets; ∆CL = change in current liabilities; ∆CASH = change in cash 
and cash equivalents; ∆STD =change in debt included in current liabilities; DEP = depreciation 
and amortization expenses. 
In the estimations of Eq. (1) the authors use all active firms in AIDA (excluding LMFs) 
which are not listed on the stock exchange and with financial statements available for 10 years 
from 2003 to 2012. The total number of these firms at the moment of its retrieval from AIDA 
is 78,340. 
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Similar to Stubben (2010) and Caylor (2010), the authors calculate discretionary revenue 
accruals (DREV) as the residuals from the following Eq. (3) estimated in the same way as Eq. 
(1). In line with Caylor (2010), this paper assumes that changes in accounts receivables are 
positively related to future changes in cash flow from operations (CFO) as well as 
contemporaneous changes in revenues, since the receivable amounts will be collected in the 
next period: 
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As the statement of CFO is not legally required for unlisted firms in Italy, CFO is computed as: 
earnings before tax – ACCR. 
Following the same rationale as DREV the authors additionally calculate discretionary 
expense accruals (DEXP) as the residuals from the following Eq. (4) estimated in the same way 
as Eq. (1): 
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Where ∆AP and ∆INV represent change in accounts payables and change in inventory, 
respectively. 
It is noteworthy that positive DEXP result in an income-decreasing effect due to a 
discretionary increase of payable invoices (∆AP) at year end which is not offset by a 
corresponding discretionary increase in inventory (∆INV). The situation is exactly the opposite 
in case of negative DEXP. 
Finally, following Ghosh and Olsen (2009), the authors measure earnings smoothing 
(SMTH) through discretionary accruals as the volatility, variance(σ2), of pre-managed earnings 
relative to the volatility of reported (managed) earnings both deflated by lagged total assets: 
SMTH	=	σ2pre-managed	earnings		–	σ2reported	earnings	 	 				(5)	
Where pre-managed earnings are computed as: reported earnings – DAC. 
The authors calculate the variances using rolling time intervals of three years in order to 
minimize the loss of observations. Furthermore, the authors standardize SMTH within each 
industry-year (two-digit SIC). If discretionary accruals are used to reduce the volatility of 
reported earnings, then this latter should be less than the volatility of pre-managed earnings. 
Hence, larger values of SMTH indicate more intensive earnings smoothing.  
 
17 
 
3.3 Control variables and base regression model 
As independent variables strictly related to the hypotheses the authors use binary variables 
LMF_PRECONF taking value of 1 for pre-confiscation LMF-years, LMF_CONF taking value 
of 1 for LMF-years in the confiscation year, LMF_POSTCONF1 taking value of 1 for LMF-
years in the first year after confiscation year, LMF_POSTCONF2 taking value of 1 for all the 
following post-confiscation LMF-years and LWF taking value of 1 for LWF-years. The latter 
is excluded from the final regression model as a base variable.  Furthermore, this study 
considers other control variables shown in the prior literature to be associated with accrual 
management (e.g. Klein, 2002; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; 
Badertscher, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Zang, 2012; Zhao et al., 2012; Alissa et al., 2013; 
Duellman et al., 2013;). Specifically, the authors include absolute change in net income 
(ABS∆NI), size (SIZE), long-term indebtedness (LEVLONG), sum of inventory and receivables 
(INVREC), assets growth (GROWTH), financial performance (ROA), and an indicator variable 
for firms reporting losses (LOSS). Furthermore, the authors include the current effective tax rate 
(ETR) (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Lanis and Richardson, 2012) consistent with the stronger 
tax avoidance incentive in unlisted firms. The authors also consider the case of firms just 
meeting zero earnings benchmark that previous studies find to be more likely to engage in 
income-increasing accrual management (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). In 
particular, Coppens and Peek (2005) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) find that unlisted firms of 
several European countries, including Italy, avoid reporting small losses. Therefore, the authors 
indicate as suspect (SUSPECT) firm-years with earnings before tax over lagged assets greater 
than or equal to zero but less than 0.01 (Gunny, 2010). Previous research documents that firms 
use a mix of earnings management techniques and trade-off between them based on their 
relative costs (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012). 
Hence, the authors include a proxy for real earnings management represented by abnormal 
material expenses (ABMAT). Based on prior studies (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 
2008; Kim et al., 2012), it is calculated as the residuals from the following Eq. (6) whose 
parameters are estimated similarly to Eq. (1): 
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Where in year t (or t - 1),  MATt are material expenses including both raw materials and trading 
goods; TA, St, and ∆St respectively represent total assets, net sales and change in net sales 
relative to previous year. Furthermore, the authors add variable REVTA (revenues divided by 
total assets), standardized by industry and year, whose abnormally high or low values may 
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provide indication of revenue manipulation (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Perols and Lougee, 
2011), which may be associated with accrual management.  
Finally, the authors include dummy variables representing industry (INDSEC) and year 
(YEAR). In summary, to test the hypotheses the following base regression model is estimated 
for the accrual management proxies: 
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The variables, whose firm subscript is suppressed for simplicity, are defined in the Appendix. 
 
4 Results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for each variable considered in the base regression model 
and related comparisons of pre-, confiscation and post-confiscation LMF-years with LWF-
years. The authors report medians because they are less likely than means to be influenced by 
extreme observations. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent 
of their distributions to avoid the influence of outliers. 
(Insert Table 3 approximately here) 
As regards dependent variables, medians of variables ABSDAC, ABSDREV and ABSDEXP are 
all significantly (p<0.01) higher for pre-confiscation LMFs (LMF_PRECONF) relative to 
LWFs, providing a first indication in support of the hypotheses H2a, H3a and H4a, respectively. 
Conversely, median of variable SMTH is higher for LMF_PRECONF but not significantly at 
conventional levels, providing some uncertainty on the support for hypothesis H1a. On the other 
hand, in the confiscation year (LMF_CONF) variables ABSDAC, ABSDREV and ABSDEXP are 
significantly (p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.01, respectively) higher for LMFs and variable SMTH is not 
significantly different, consistent with hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3b and H4b. In addition, there 
is no significant difference in level of SMTH, ABSDAC and ABSDREV between LWFs and 
LMFs in the first post-confiscation year (LMF_POSTCONF1), whereas in the following post-
confiscation years (LMF_POSTCONF2) ABSDAC and SMTH are even significantly (p<0.01) 
lower. Finally, variable ABSDEXP is still significantly (p<0.05) higher for LMFs in the first 
post-confiscation year and it only becomes insignificantly different in the following post-
(7) 
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confiscation years. Overall, these results provide a first support for hypotheses H1c, H2c, H3c 
and H4c.      
As regards the signed values of the accrual management proxies, there is no significant 
difference in level of DAC between LWFs and pre-confiscation LMFs, indicating a null 
directional effect on income of accrual management practices within LMFs. In contrast, 
variable DAC is negative and significantly (p<0.01) lower for LMFs in the confiscation year. 
On the other hand, variables DREV and DEXP are both positive and significantly higher, at 
different conventional levels, for LMFs both before confiscation and in the confiscation year. 
This suggests that LMFs may simultaneously engage in income-increasing revenue accrual 
management and income-decreasing expense accrual management, whose effects on income 
are only significant in the year of confiscation as reflected by the DAC aggregate accrual 
management proxy. Overall, these results provide a first confirmation of Stubben’s (2010) 
findings on the superiority of specific accrual models over aggregate accrual models in 
detecting a combination of revenue and expense manipulation especially in growth firms such 
as LMFs.  
Turning to control variables, it is noteworthy that in the years following the confiscation 
LMFs appear significantly (p<0.01) more long term indebted (LEVLONG) than LWFs. This 
may be due to the loss of the criminal organization support granting financial resources and 
competitive advantages (Arlacchi, 1983; Fantò, 1999). In addition, both before and after 
confiscation LMFs are significantly (p<0.01) less profitable (ROA) than LWFs. An 
overinvestment of financial resources stemming from illegal activities and a downward real 
earnings management may explain the lower profitability of LMFs before confiscation. On the 
other hand, the cost of the reinstatement of legality and the loss of business opportunities and 
competitive advantages (Arlacchi, 1983; Fantò, 1999) may be the causes after confiscation. A 
further consistent indication is the significantly (p<0.01) higher total assets growth rate 
(GROWTH) of LMFs before confiscation, presumably financed with dirty money, that becomes 
significantly (p<0.01) lower after confiscation because of the likely suspension of any money 
laundering activity. As regards real earnings management variable ABMAT, it is significantly 
(p<0.01) higher for LMFs both before and after confiscation, whereas abnormal revenues 
(REVTA) are significantly (p<0.01) lower both before and after confiscation. 
Table 4 shows that Pearson correlations among independent variables of the base regression 
model in Eq. (6) are low (below 0.29), thus providing a first indication that collinearity is 
unlikely to affect estimations. 
(Insert Table 4 approximately here)  
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4.2 Multivariate regression analysis 
In order to test the hypotheses, the authors estimate the model in Eq. (7) through a linear 
regression with standard errors adjusted by a two dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels 
(Gow et al., 2010; Colin et al., 2011), considering the likely correlation of the residuals across 
firm and/or over time. Table 5 presents the results for the unsigned accrual management proxies. 
(Insert Table 5 approximately here) 
First of all, it is noteworthy that all the estimated regressions are significant at the 0.01 level 
according to the chi-square tests. As regards variables relevant for the hypotheses, coefficient 
on LMF_PRECONF is positive and significant at conventional levels in all regressions.  These 
results provide support for hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3a and H4a, indicating that LMFs before 
confiscation engage more in earnings smoothing as well as in aggregate, revenue and expense 
accrual management, respectively. Interestingly, coefficient on LMF_CONF is also positive 
and significant (p<0.01) in all regressions except in SMTH regression, where it is not significant 
at conventional levels, consistent with hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3b and H4b. Hence, in the 
confiscation year LMFs continue engaging more in accrual management than LWFs do, 
although for reasons other than smoothing earnings. On the other hand, coefficient on 
LMF_POSTCONF1 is not significant at conventional levels in SMTH, ABSDAC and ABSDREV 
regressions, whereas it is still positive and significant (p<0.01) in ABSDEXP regression. 
Finally, coefficient on LMF_POSTCONF2 is not significant at conventional levels in SMTH, 
ABSDAC and ABSDEXP regressions, whereas it is only marginally significant (p<0.10) in 
ABSDREV regression. Overall, these latter results provide support for hypotheses H1c, H2c, 
H3c and H4c indicating that, after the accounting adjustments carried out by legal 
administrators in the year of confiscation, in the post-confiscation years accrual management 
in LMFs tends to become consistent with that of LWFs. 
As regards the rest of control variables, it is noteworthy that all their coefficients are mostly 
significant at the 0.01 level and with the expected sign, based on previous studies, with only 
some few exceptions. In particular, coefficient on GROWTH is positive and significant (p<0.01) 
in all regressions indicating that accrual management is more intensive in faster growing firms. 
On the other hand, coefficients on SIZE, LEVLONG, ROA and ETR are negative and significant 
at conventional levels, suggesting that larger, more long-term indebted, more profitable and less 
tax avoider firms engage less in accrual management, respectively. Furthermore, coefficients 
on REVTA is positive and significant (p<0.01) in all regressions providing evidence that firms 
showing higher abnormal revenues engage more in accrual management. Finally, coefficient 
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on ABMAT is positive and significant (p<0.01) in SMTH, ABSDAC and ABSDEXP regressions, 
whereas it is not significant in ABSDREV regression, suggesting that real earnings management 
through abnormal material expenses is mostly reflected in expense accrual management rather 
than revenue accrual management.  
In summary, the multiple regression analysis suggests that before confiscation and in the 
year of confiscation LMFs engage more in aggregate, revenue and expense accrual management 
than LWFs do. In contrast, in the rest of post-confiscation years, after the initial accounting 
adjustments and regularizations performed by legal administrators, LMFs tend to adopt accrual 
management practices more similar to those of LWFs.    
 
4.3 Additional analysis 
4.3.1 Matching procedure 
The authors perform a robustness test of the results by estimating the base regression model 
within a matched sample. So as to define a control sample, researchers choose from a wide 
range of firm characteristics on which to match such as: cash flows, year, industry, net income, 
size proxied by sales or total assets, ROA, etc. (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Perry and 
Williams, 1994; Defond and Subramanyam, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998; Kothari et al., 2005). The 
authors match each LMF-year to three LWF-years on year, industry, sign of ROA and size 
proxied by total assets. Table 6 shows the results of the estimations with standard errors adjusted 
by a two dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels. 
(Insert Table 6 approximately here) 
All the estimated regressions are significant at the 0.01 level according to the chi-square tests. 
Results of matched sample estimations are mostly consistent with those of the unmatched 
sample. Indeed, coefficients on variables LMF_PRECONF and LMF_CONF are positive and 
significant at conventional levels in all regressions. However, in SMTH regression coefficient 
on LMF_CONF is only marginally significant (p<0.10), consistent with the hypothesized 
weakening of the incentive to smooth earnings. On the other hand, coefficients on variables 
LMF_POSTCONF1 and LMF_POSTCONF2 are not significant at conventional levels with the 
exceptions of marginally significant (p<0.10) coefficients on LMF_POSTCONF1 in ABSDEXP 
regression and on LMF_POSTCONF2 in ABSDREV regression. Overall, these results provide 
further support for all the hypotheses. As regards the rest of control variables, signs of 
coefficients are mostly consistent with those of the unmatched sample estimations, although 
some coefficients are not significant at conventional levels. 
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In summary, the documented robustness of the results to different estimation methods can 
relieve concerns that the findings are driven by uncontrolled factors. 
 
4.3.2 Regression analysis with signed accrual management proxies 
To test the hypotheses, similar to previous studies (Warfield et al., 1995; Klein, 2002; Kim et 
al., 2012), this study uses the unsigned value of the discretionary accruals proxies given that 
accrual management can be either income-increasing or income-decreasing. However, to 
address the possibility that the difference in accrual management between LMFs and LWFs is 
also directional in terms of impact on the income, the authors re-estimate the base regression 
model in Eq. (7) using the signed measures of accrual management. Table 7 shows the results 
of the estimations with standard errors adjusted by a two dimensional cluster at the firm and 
year levels. 
(Insert Table 7 approximately here) 
Again, all the estimated regressions are significant at the 0.01 level according to the chi-square 
tests. Interestingly, coefficient on variable LMF_PRECONF is not significant at conventional 
levels in any regression. These results are plausible given that in the long-term accrual 
management can hardly be directional. Indeed, discretionary accruals in one period must 
reverse in another period (Dechow et al., 2012). Furthermore, earnings smoothing and money 
laundering concealing may require both positive and negative discretionary accruals.  
On the other hand, coefficient on LMF_CONF is positive and significant (p<0.01) in both 
DREV and DEXP regression, whereas it is negative and significant (p<0.05) in DAC regression. 
Overall, these results suggest that in the confiscation year LMFs upward manage both revenue 
and expense accruals with a negative cumulative effect on aggregate accruals and income. 
Adjustments of prior to confiscation misreporting and the regularization of some transactions 
carried out by legal administrators may explain these results. Furthermore, there may be 
uncollectible receivables and outstanding payables, whose settlement is frozen by legal 
administrators, given that they may be related to fictitious transactions with colluded parties 
under investigation. 
More importantly, these results represent a further confirmation of Stubben’s (2010) findings 
on the informative superiority of specific accrual models over aggregate accrual models in 
detecting a combination of revenue and expense manipulation. Finally, we find similar results 
by repeating the estimations within a matched sample. 
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4.3.3 Alternative measure of discretionary accruals 
In order to test the robustness of the results to alternative measures of accrual management, we 
repeat the estimations of our model of Eq. (7) by using discretionary working capital accruals 
based on the Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model, which previous studies (Jones et al., 2008) 
find to be highly associated with the existence of fraudulent accounting manipulations. In 
particular, discretionary working capital accruals (ABSDAC_DD) are computed as the absolute 
value of residuals from the following Eq. (8), estimated in the same way as Eq. (1):    
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Where ∆WC is the change in working capital from year t-1 to year t and it is equal to accrual 
variable ACCR of Eq. (2) excluding depreciation and amortization expenses. 
Table 8 shows the results of the estimations with standard errors adjusted by a two dimensional 
cluster at the firm and year levels. 
(Insert Table 8 approximately here) 
The estimated ABSDAC_DD regression is significant at the 0.01 level according to the chi-
square test. Interestingly, coefficient on variable LMF_PRECONF is positive and significant 
(p<0.01), consistent with the hypothesis on the more intensive accrual management of LMFs 
before confiscation. Conversely, coefficients on variables LMF_CONF, LMF_POSTCONF1 
and LMF_POSTCONF2 are not significant at conventional levels, suggesting that in the 
confiscation and post-confiscation years there is no significant difference in working capital 
accrual management between LMFs and LWFs. This provides further evidence of the 
significant impact of the intervention of legal administrators on LMFs practices. 
It is noteworthy that, unlike ABSDAC_DD regression, coefficient on variable LMF_CONF 
is significant (p<0.01) in the previously examined ABSDAC regression, consistent with 
hypothesis H2b of this study. This difference between the two regressions may be due to the 
fact that working capital accruals of Dechow and Dichev’s model do not include long-term 
accruals such as depreciation and amortization expenses. This is a further confirmation of the 
need to examine specific accruals rather than aggregate accruals in order to gain a deeper insight 
into how accrual management is actually performed.  
 
5 Discussions and conclusions  
In this study the authors examine how accounting is used to disguise and realize Mafia money 
laundering activities and whether discretionary expense, revenue and aggregate accruals can 
provide evidence of these illicit practices within a sample of 224 Italian firms, defined as LMFs, 
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due to having been confiscated by judicial authorities because of their owners being accused of 
Mafia-type association. 
Overall, the results reveal that in the pre- and confiscation years LMFs manage aggregate, 
revenue and expense accruals in order to smooth earnings and disguise money laundering. In 
contrast, in the post-confiscation years there is no significant difference in level of accrual 
management between LMFs and LWFs because of the intervention of legal administrators. 
Furthermore, in the confiscation year LMFs upward manage both revenue and expense accruals 
with a negative cumulative effect on aggregate accruals and income.  
Importantly, the results confirm previous studies on unlisted firms finding that the use of 
financial statements in contracting with stakeholders may deter accrual management for illicit 
purposes such as tax avoidance (Klassen, 1997; Beatty and Harris, 1999; Coppens and Peek, 
2005). Indeed, the more intensive accrual management within LMFs may be explained by their 
competitive advantages and market power, arising from the artificial scarcity they create 
(Champeyrache, 2014), that make their financial statements irrelevant to the determination of 
the terms of trades with stakeholders. 
Previous studies find that several discretionary accrual proxies show significant differences, 
relative to a control sample, for firms charged by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) with having committed fraud by overstating earnings (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones et al., 
2008; Stubben, 2010; Dechow et al., 2011). It is worth noting that these studies mostly employ 
discretionary aggregate accruals and focus on specifically detected fraudulent manipulations 
aiming to overstate earnings under specific stimuli and circumstances at certain points in time. 
On the other hand, this paper examines LMFs over several years, assuming accrual management 
to smooth earnings and disguise money laundering, rather than overstating earnings, to be 
systematically carried out for the whole period. Furthermore, the authors analyze both 
discretionary expense accruals and discretionary revenue accruals in order to provide better 
evidence of the scope of the manipulations. Hence, as a further contribution, this study shows 
that accrual models may provide evidence of fraudulent manipulations related to tax avoidance 
and money laundering as well as to overstatements of earnings.  
In addition, this study relieves prior concerns on the ability of discretionary accrual proxies 
to detect fraudulent accounting manipulations (e.g. Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Jones et al., 
2008; Stubben, 2010). Indeed, the detected change of the accrual management pattern, 
following the reinstatement of legality pursued by legal administrators after confiscation, 
suggests the effectiveness of discretionary accrual proxies in providing evidence of fraudulent 
accounting prior to confiscation. Therefore, discretionary aggregate and specific accrual 
25 
 
measures can at least be considered as red flags which could complement other risk indicators 
of illicit practices in specific socio-economic and political contexts. More specifically, 
discretionary accrual values may be added to the criteria used by authorities to select firms to 
be regularly inspected in order to unmask money laundering and tax avoidance practices. 
Enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of inspections would strengthen the fight against 
criminal funding. Furthermore, it would allow authorities to collect additional resources, 
through confiscation of criminally derived assets, and finance public policies in economically 
depressed regions, where criminal organizations find fertile ground. In this regard, Barone and 
Narciso (2015) document Mafia's ability to divert a substantial amount of public funds assigned 
to poor areas. Moreover, the detection and regularization of LMFs may restore free competition 
in the regions where they operate (Arlacchi, 1983; Fantò, 1999) and increase foreign direct 
investments (Daniele and Marani, 2011), with consequent benefits for the local economy.    
However, these findings are subject to several limitations. Firstly, it cannot be rejected the 
possibility of a bias in the selection of the sample of LMFs, considering that undetected LMFs 
are unobservable and smaller LMFs, unavailable on AIDA, are excluded. Furthermore, there 
could be selection biases in LMFs pursued and confiscated by Italian judicial authorities. 
Finally, the measures of accrual management in LMFs greatly depend on the reliability of 
reported financial statement figures. Indeed, the likely manipulation of these figures and the 
consequent endogenity in the calculation models may affect the correct interpretation of the 
measures. However, the consistent results of the estimations within a matched sample may 
partially relieve this concern. 
The authors envisage some opportunities for future research. First, this study could be 
replicated in other countries, where money laundering is widespread, in order to determine 
whether its results are confirmed in a different cultural, legal and institutional context. In 
particular, previous studies (Forgione, 2009; Roth, 2009; Transcrime, 2013) document the 
infiltration of Italian Mafia in the legal economy of several European countries (e.g. Spain, 
Germany, Netherlands) and the aforementioned Eurostat (2013) study on money laundering 
finds that money laundering practices involving firms are widespread across all European 
countries. Second, additional accrual management proxies and models could be developed and 
tested in order to consider further specific accruals which may be linked to money laundering 
activities or other illicit practices. Finally, accrual management proxies jointly with other 
financial and non-financial variables could be included in a logistic model which may 
contribute to the detection of firms engaging in money laundering activities. In particular, a 
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logistic model would allow considering the predictive power of several additional variables and 
their association with the aforementioned illicit practices.    
 
6 Appendix 
6.1 Definition of variables of the base regression model (Eq. (7)) 
AM_PROXY (accrual management proxy) = SMTH, DAC, ABSDAC, DREV, ABSDREV, DEXP, 
ABSDEXP, ABSDAC_DD: 
 SMTH = earnings smoothing measure as defined in Eq. (5) 
DAC = aggregate discretionary accruals equal to residuals from Eq. (1) 
ABSDAC = absolute value of DAC 
DREV = discretionary revenue accruals equal to residuals from Eq. (3) 
ABSDREV = absolute values of DREV 
DEXP = discretionary expense accruals equal to residuals from Eq. (4) 
ABSDEXP = absolute value of DEXP 
ABSDAC_DD = discretionary working capital accruals equal to absolute value of 
residuals from Eq. (8) 
LMF_PRECONF = dummy variable taking value of 1 for pre-confiscation LMF-years and 0 
otherwise 
LMF_CONF = dummy variable taking value of 1 for LMF-years in the confiscation year and 0 
otherwise 
LMF_POSTCONF1 = dummy variable taking value of 1 for LMF-years in the first year after 
confiscation year and 0 otherwise 
LMF_POSTCONF2 = dummy variable taking value of 1 for all LMF-years following the first 
post-confiscation LMF-years and 0 otherwise 
ABS∆NI = absolute value of (net income – lagged net income)/ lagged total assets 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
LEVLONG = long-term liabilities divided by total assets 
INVREC = total inventories and receivables divided by total assets  
GROWTH = (total assets − lagged total assets)/ lagged total assets  
ROA = income before tax divided by total assets 
ETR = current tax expense divided by income before tax 
REVTA = total revenues divided by total assets standardized by industry and year 
ABMAT = abnormal material expenses equal to residuals from Eq. (6) 
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LOSS = dummy variable that that takes a value of 1 if the firm had two or more consecutive 
years of negative income including the current and 0 otherwise 
SUSPECT = dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for firm-years with earnings before tax 
over lagged assets greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.01 and 0 otherwise  
INDSEC = dummy variables representing industry defined by the two-digit SIC code 
YEAR = dummy variables representing the fiscal year 
 
6.2 Abbreviations 
ANBSC National agency for the management and assignment of seized and confiscated 
assets 
CFO  Cash flow from operations  
DAC  Discretionary aggregate accruals 
DEXP  Discretionary expense accruals 
DREV  Discretionary revenue accruals 
GAAP  Generally accepted accounting principles 
IFRS  International financial reporting standard 
LMFs  Legally registered Mafia firms 
LWFs  Lawful firms 
SEC  Securities and Exchange Commission 
SIC  Standard industrial classification 
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Table 1. Sample selection 
 
 
Number of firms 
LMFs sample 
 
LMFs definitively confiscated at November 5th 2012 provided by 
ANBSC 
1,663 
Less: LMFs provided by ANBSC with data unavailable on AIDA 
database 
-1,609 
Add: LMFs found on AIDA database with status confiscated 118 
Add: confiscated LMFs found in online newspapers with data 
available in AIDA 
52 
Final LMFs sample 224 
LMFs year observations in base regression model (ABSDAC) 1,094 
  
LWFs control sample 
 
Aida population of active and unlisted firms with available financial 
data from 2003 to 2012 in the same two-digit SIC industries as LMFs 
78,340 
LWFs year observations in base regression model (ABSDAC) 540,339 
Source: ANBSC and AIDA database, 2013. 
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Table 2. Industry distribution of LMFs and AIDA population of active unlisted firms 
with available financial data from 2003 to 2012 restricted to LMFs industries  
Sic code Industry description AIDA population LMFs 
  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
01 Agricultural production-crops 644 0.82 4 1.79 
14 Mining and quarrying of 
nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 
463 0.59 9 4.02 
15 Building construction-general 
contractors and operative builders 
5,486 7.00 41 18.30 
16 Heavy construction other than 
building construction-contractors 
524 0.67 3 1.34 
17 Construction-special trade 
contractors 
4,032 5.15 8 3.57 
20 Food and kindred products 3,224 4.12 6 2.68 
25 Furniture and fixtures 
manufacturing 
829 1.06 3 1.34 
28 Chemicals and allied products 
manufacturing 
1,598 2.04 1 0.45 
29 Petroleum refining and related 
industries 
158 0.20 2 0.89 
32 Stone, clay, glass and concrete 
products manufacturing 
1,960 2.50 13 5.80 
34 Fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and transportation 
equipment 
7,038 8.98 2 0.89 
42 Motor freight transportation and 
warehousing 
2,894 3.69 18 8.04 
44 Water transportation 586 0.75 1 0.45 
45 Transportation by air 95 0.12 1 0.45 
47 Transportation services 1,884 2.40 3 1.34 
49 Electric, gas and sanitary services 1,419 1.81 7 3.13 
50 Wholesale trade, durable goods 14,064 17.95 23 10.27 
51 Wholesale trade, nondurable goods 
wholesale dealing in 
7,821 9.98 19 8.48 
52 Building materials, hardware, 
garden supply, and mobile home 
dealers wholesale dealing in 
1,018 1.30 1 0.45 
53 General merchandise stores 324 0.41 1 0.45 
54 Food stores 1,737 2.22 16 7.14 
55 Automotive dealers and gasoline 
service stations 
536 0.68 4 1.79 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 1,920 2.45 3 1.34 
57 Home furniture, furnishings, and 
equipment stores 
872 1.11 1 0.45 
58 Eating and drinking places 1,007 1.29 2 0.89 
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Table 2. Industry distribution of LMFs and AIDA population of active unlisted firms 
with available financial data from 2003 to 2012 restricted to LMFs industries  
Sic code Industry description AIDA population LMFs 
  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
59 Miscellaneous retail 1,475 1.88 1 0.45 
65 Real estate 2,239 2.86 7 3.13 
70 Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and 
other lodging places 
1,600 2.04 3 1.34 
72 Personal services 327 0.42 1 0.45 
73 Business services 5,001 6.38 2 0.89 
75 Automotive repair, services, and 
parking 
882 1.13 1 0.45 
79 Amusement and recreation services 744 0.95 5 2.23 
80 Health services 1,165 1.49 9 4.02 
81 Legal services 19 0.02 1 0.45 
87 Engineering, accounting, research, 
management, and related services 
2,755 3.52 2 0.89 
Total 78,340 100.00 224 100.00 
 
Source: AIDA database, 2013. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and variable comparison between LMFs and LWFs  
   
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
        
 
LMF_PRECONF LMF_CONF LMF_POSTCONF1 LMF_POSTCONF2 LWFs 
 
N Median N Median N Median N Median N Median 
Dependent Variables 
SMTH 562 -0.3171 112 -0.3312 88 -0.3649 336 -0.3968 550,835 -0.3492 
DAC 631 -0.0004 98 -0.0396 74 -0.0002 291 0.0021 541,446 -0.0006 
ABSDAC 631 0.1197 98 0.0950 74 0.0694 291 0.0572 541,446 0.0780 
DREV 573 0.0110 90 0.0074 71 -0.0098 277 0.0028 534,121 -0.0085 
ABSDREV 573 0.0962 90 0.0954 71 0.0593 277 0.0516 534,121 0.0611 
DEXP 585 0.0090 90 0.0343 71 0.0062 276 0.0071 549,070 -0.0045 
ABSDEXP 585 0.1061 90 0.1154 71 0.0952 276 0.0551 549,070 0.0662 
Control Variables 
ABS∆NI  750 0.0136 108 0.0347 87 0.0281 322 0.0176 671,114 0.0138 
SIZE 967 7.9444 115 8.1153 90 8.2226 348 8.2891 753,484 7.8023 
LEVLONG 967 0.0238 115 0.0353 90 0.0502 348 0.0781 753,480 0.0296 
INVREC 928 0.6439 109 0.6298 86 0.5912 334 0.5770 705,084 0.6141 
GROWTH 750 0.1089 108 0.0105 87 0.0147 322 0.0032 671,352 0.0371 
ROA 967 0.0220 115 0.0130 90 0.0075 348 0.0113 753,371 0.0276 
ETR 966 0.4229 115 0.1828 90 0.3346 348 0.3503 751,630 0.5153 
REVTA 750 -0.3405 108 -0.4008 87 -0.4430 322 -0.4795 671,157 -0.2087 
ABMAT 622 0.0599 99 0.0463 82 0.0304 309 0.0701 661,717 -0.0037 
%LOSS 3.90% 
 
6.21% 
 
19.01% 
 
17.11% 
 
6.34% 
 
%SUSPECT 6.75% 
 
5.65% 
 
6.34% 
 
6.60% 
 
10.32% 
 
 
42 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and variable comparison between LMFs and LWFs  
Panel B. Variable median comparison between LMFs and LWFs  
 
LMF_PRECONF 
minus LWFs 
LMF_CONF 
minus LWFs 
LMF_POSTCONF1 
minus LWFs 
LMF_POSTCONF2 
minus LWFs 
 
Difference Test Difference Test Difference Test Difference Test 
Dependent Variables 
       
SMTH 0.0321 
 
0.0180 
 
-0.0157 
 
-0.0476 *** 
DAC 0.0002 
 
-0.0390 *** 0.0004 
 
0.0027 
 
ABSDAC 0.0416 *** 0.0169 ** -0.0086 
 
-0.0208 *** 
DREV 0.0195 *** 0.0159 ** -0.0013 
 
0.0113 ** 
ABSDREV 0.0351 *** 0.0343 *** -0.0018 
 
-0.0095 
 
DEXP 0.0135 * 0.0388 *** 0.0106 
 
0.0116 
 
ABSDEXP 0.0399 *** 0.0492 *** 0.0290 ** -0.0110 
 
Control Variables 
       
ABS∆NI  -0.0002 ** 0.0210 *** 0.0143 *** 0.0039 *** 
SIZE 0.1421 
 
0.3130 ** 0.4203 ** 0.4867 *** 
LEVLONG -0.0058 
 
0.0057 
 
0.0207 
 
0.0486 *** 
INVREC 0.0298 * 0.0156 
 
-0.0229 
 
-0.0372 
 
GROWTH 0.0718 *** -0.0266 
 
-0.0225 
 
-0.0339 *** 
ROA -0.0055 *** -0.0145 *** -0.0201 *** -0.0163 *** 
ETR -0.0924 *** -0.3325 *** -0.1808 *** -0.1650 *** 
REVTA -0.1318 *** -0.1921 ** -0.2342 ** -0.2708 *** 
ABMAT 0.0636 *** 0.0500 *** 0.0341 ** 0.0739 *** 
%LOSS -2.44% *** -0.12% 
 
12.68% *** 10.78% *** 
%SUSPECT -3.57% *** -4.67% ** -3.98% 
 
-3.72% *** 
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Notes: The sample full period spans 2003–2012. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon test for the differences in medians of continuous variables. Pearson chi-squared test of independence for categorical variables: %LOSS = % 
of firms with two or more consecutive years of negative income; %SUSPECT = % of firms just beating/meeting the zero earnings before tax benchmark. 
LMF_PRECONF = pre-confiscation LMF-years; LMF_CONF = LMF-years in the confiscation year; LMF_POSTCONF1 = first post-confiscation LMF-years; 
LMF_POSTCONF2 = LMF-years following the first post-confiscation LMF-years; SMTH = earnings smoothing measure as defined in Eq. (5); DAC = aggregate 
discretionary accruals equal to residuals from Eq. (1); ABSDAC = absolute value of DAC; DREV = discretionary revenue accruals equal to residuals from Eq. 
(3); ABSDREV = absolute values of DREV; DEXP = discretionary expense accruals equal to residuals from Eq. (4); ABSDEXP = absolute value of DEXP; 
ABS∆NI = absolute value of (net income – lagged net income)/ lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; LEVLONG = long-term liabilities 
divided by total assets; INVREC = total inventories and receivables divided by total assets; GROWTH = (total assets − lagged total assets)/ lagged total assets; 
ROA = income before tax divided by total assets; ETR = current tax expense divided by income before tax; REVTA = total revenues divided by total assets 
standardized by industry and year; ABMAT = abnormal material expenses equal to residuals from Eq. (6). 
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Table 4. Pearson correlations between independent variables  
 
ABS∆NI  SIZE LEVLONG INVREC GROWTH ROA ETR REVTA ABMAT 
ABS∆NI  1 
                
SIZE -0.113 *** 1 
              
LEVLONG -0.066 *** 0.170 *** 1 
            
INVREC -0.085 *** 0.003 ** -0.180 *** 1 
          
GROWTH 0.123 *** 0.060 *** 0.021 *** -0.009 *** 1 
        
ROA 0.098 *** -0.105 *** -0.195 *** -0.056 *** 0.098 *** 1 
      
ETR -0.112 *** -0.038 *** -0.015 *** 0.034 *** 0.010 *** 0.026 *** 1 
    
REVTA 0.135 *** -0.284 *** -0.237 *** 0.105 *** 0.279 *** 0.215 *** 0.024 *** 1 
  
ABMAT -0.084 *** 0.047 *** 0.069 *** 0.071 *** 0.041 *** -0.191 *** -0.019 *** -0.046 *** 1 
 
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. Variables are defined in the Appendix and in the 
notes of Table 3. 
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Table 5. Regressions of accrual management proxies 
  SMTH ABSDAC ABSDREV ABSDEXP 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Variables of interest: 
        
LMF_PRECONF 0.262 0.013 0.024 0.015 0.029 0.000 0.023 0.000 
(Hypothesis/Exp. Sign) H1a/+ 
 
H2a/+ 
 
H3a/+ 
 
H4a/+ 
 
LMF_CONF 0.386 0.134 0.038 0.005 0.047 0.007 0.062 0.007 
(Hypothesis/Exp. Sign) H1b/0 
 
H2b/+ 
 
H3b/+ 
 
H4b/+ 
 
LMF_POSTCONF1 0.070 0.640 -0.011 0.266 0.006 0.616 0.022 0.001 
LMF_POSTCONF2 0.133 0.268 0.005 0.659 0.020 0.070 0.008 0.350 
(Hypothesis/Exp. Sign) H1c/0 
 
H2c/0 
 
H3c/0 
 
H4c/0 
 
Control variables: 
        
ABS∆NI  0.613 0.000 0.289 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.206 0.000 
SIZE -0.108 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.010 0.000 
LEVLONG -0.325 0.000 -0.051 0.000 -0.061 0.000 -0.038 0.000 
INVREC -0.260 0.000 -0.030 0.038 0.000 0.986 0.010 0.190 
GROWTH 0.211 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.078 0.000 
ROA -0.203 0.062 -0.045 0.016 -0.037 0.000 -0.069 0.000 
ETR -0.012 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
REVTA 0.071 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.012 0.000 
ABMAT 0.119 0.000 0.014 0.000 -0.001 0.167 0.010 0.000 
LOSS -0.014 0.074 0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.074 0.003 0.015 
SUSPECT 0.081 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.012 0.000 
INDSEC dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
YEAR dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept 1.082 0.000 0.411 0.000 0.252 0.000 0.237 
 
Number of obs. 501,089 
 
534,991 
 
527,782 
 
528,552 
 
R-squared 0.144 
 
0.188 
 
0.176 
 
0.155 
 
Wald χ2 1.79E+04 0.000 8.70E+06 0.000 6.70E+06 0 2.50E+08 0.000 
 
Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. Variables are defined in the Appendix and in the notes of Table 3. 
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Table 6. Regressions of accrual management proxies within a matched sample 
  SMTH ABSDAC ABSDREV ABSDEXP 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Variables of interest: 
        
LMF_PRECONF 0.279 0.006 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.000 0.025 0.000 
(Hypothesis/Exp. Sign) H1a/+ 
 
H2a/+ 
 
H3a/+ 
 
H4a/+ 
 
LMF_CONF 0.407 0.093 0.037 0.025 0.043 0.013 0.056 0.018 
(Hypothesis/Exp. Sign) H1b/0 
 
H2b/+ 
 
H3b/+ 
 
H4b/+ 
 
LMF_POSTCONF1 0.099 0.496 0.000 0.998 0.018 0.213 0.021 0.071 
LMF_POSTCONF2 0.140 0.240 0.006 0.634 0.019 0.070 0.012 0.168 
(Hypothesis/Exp. Sign) H1c/0 
 
H2c/0 
 
H3c/0 
 
H4c/0 
 
Control variables: 
        
ABS∆NI  0.668 0.197 0.300 0.000 0.203 0.001 0.226 0.000 
SIZE -0.155 0.000 -0.019 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.016 0.000 
LEVLONG 0.062 0.702 -0.008 0.607 -0.058 0.000 -0.018 0.166 
INVREC 0.006 0.943 -0.015 0.308 0.027 0.088 0.038 0.000 
GROWTH 0.436 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.095 0.000 
ROA 0.027 0.959 0.013 0.736 -0.032 0.271 -0.055 0.130 
ETR 0.011 0.409 -0.003 0.187 -0.003 0.152 -0.001 0.524 
REVTA 0.072 0.036 0.005 0.267 0.017 0.000 0.008 0.010 
ABMAT 0.090 0.327 0.012 0.147 0.013 0.090 0.009 0.239 
LOSS -0.032 0.739 -0.007 0.369 -0.009 0.042 -0.005 0.507 
SUSPECT 0.026 0.775 0.006 0.538 0.009 0.344 0.018 0.043 
INDSEC dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
YEAR dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of obs. 3,482 
 
3,739 
 
3,615 
 
3,598 
 
R-squared 0.103 
 
0.219 
 
0.229 
 
0.208 
 
Wald χ2 4.24E+04 0.000 2.60E+06 0.000 7.30E+04 0 6.10E+05 0.000 
 
Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. Variables are defined in the Appendix and in the notes of Table 3. 
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Table 7. Regressions of signed accrual management proxies 
 
DAC DREV DEXP 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Variables of interest: 
      
LMF_PRECONF -0.009 0.370 0.014 0.200 0.006 0.478 
LMF_CONF -0.059 0.011 0.072 0.001 0.090 0.001 
LMF_POSTCONF1 -0.034 0.205 -0.003 0.826 0.000 0.985 
LMF_POSTCONF2 0.015 0.278 0.027 0.000 0.006 0.186 
Control variables: 
      
ABS∆NI  -0.115 0.001 -0.069 0.000 -0.011 0.776 
SIZE -0.002 0.595 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.001 
LEVLONG 0.008 0.754 -0.047 0.009 -0.021 0.161 
INVREC 0.043 0.184 -0.110 0.000 -0.048 0.015 
GROWTH 0.156 0.000 0.262 0.000 0.178 0.000 
ROA -0.025 0.409 -0.074 0.000 -0.007 0.612 
ETR 0.000 0.360 0.000 0.251 -0.001 0.000 
REVTA -0.013 0.009 -0.004 0.165 -0.002 0.320 
ABMAT 0.052 0.000 -0.019 0.000 -0.029 0.000 
LOSS -0.006 0.098 -0.006 0.024 0.024 0.000 
SUSPECT 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.061 0.010 0.000 
INDSEC dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
YEAR dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept -0.036 0.403 0.015 0.545 -0.036 0.048 
Number of obs. 534,991 
 
527,782 
 
528,552 
 
R-squared 0.050 
 
0.184 
 
0.098 
 
Wald χ2 3.19E+04 0.000 1.30E+06 0 5.32E+04 0.000 
 
Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. Variables are defined in the Appendix and in the notes of Table 3.
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Table 8. Regression of Dechow and Dichev’s discretionary accrual proxy  
  
                   ABSDAC_DD 
  Coef. p-value 
Variables of interest: 
  
LMF_PRECONF 0.0139 0.000 
LMF_CONF 0.0098 0.213 
LMF_POSTCONF1 0.0012 0.793 
LMF_POSTCONF2 0.0055 0.175 
Control variables: 
  
ABS∆NI  0.5728 0.000 
SIZE -0.0015 0.000 
LEVLONG -0.0056 0.000 
INVREC -0.0014 0.375 
GROWTH 0.0293 0.000 
ROA 0.1434 0.000 
ETR -0.0015 0.000 
REVTA 0.0028 0.000 
ABMAT -0.0060 0.000 
LOSS 0.0376 0.000 
SUSPECT 0.0109 0.000 
INDSEC dummies Yes 
 
YEAR dummies Yes 
 
Intercept 0.0426 0.000 
Number of obs. 487,817 
 
R-squared 0.3100 
 
Wald χ2 1.50E+07 0.000 
 
 Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. Variables are defined in the Appendix and in the notes of Table 3. 
 
